An empirical approach follows Sellings (1960) from early work on negotiation and game theory by examining how real people negotiate and reach an agreement. Pioneers of experimental economics used laboratory experiments to study how subjects behaved in the event of division problems (Hoffman et al. 2000, Smith, 2003). Some of the most interesting results have come, perhaps surprisingly, from asymmetrical negotiation games such as the ultimatum game (Smith, 1982). Since these first experiments, considerable experimental work has been carried out on negotiation problems and cooperation agreements in the economy. Much of the more philosophical work focuses on the importance of social norms and conventions in determining outcome (Bicchieri 2016, Vanderschraaf for publication). The ultimate goal of social contract theories is therefore to show, in the most general sense of the word, that social theories (moral, political, legal, etc.) Rules can be rationally justified. However, this does not distinguish the social contract from other approaches to moral and political philosophy, all of which attempt to show that moral and political rules are rationally defensible in some sense. The real peculiarity of the social contract approach is that justification is not based on exogenous reason or truth. Justification is generated by rational consistency (or a missing refusal in T.M. Scanlon`s version), not by the reasons that create the concordance. In other words, the fact that everyone in a society, by reason of his or her individual reasoning, would agree with a particular rule or principle, is the decisive justification for that rule and not certain just or valid reasons that would appreciate sufficiently rational individuals and, if appreciated, would lead to an agreement. If our entrenched problem is not simply to understand what requires morality, but if morality is to be respected or rather seen as superstition based on outdated metaphysical theories, it is obvious that the parties to the agreement should not apply moral judgments in their arguments.

Another version of this concern is Gregory Kavkas (1984) Description of the project of reconciling morality and prudence. In both areas, the objective of the Treaty is to show that a commitment to morality is an effective means of promoting non-moral objectives and interests. Here, the legitimate problem is to answer satisfactorily the question “Why be moral?” In a fairly simple sense, this “contractual” project is reductive: it derives from non-moral moral reasons. Or, to use Rawls` terminology, she tries to generate what is reasonable from the rational (1996, 53). We all agree that Mr. Ross should resign. Management announced that it had reached an agreement with the unions. The twenty-six countries have signed an agreement to reduce air pollution. He advised her to be conscientious in turn and demand a copy of the agreement. .

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